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Abstract
This study analyzes socially optimal environmental policy for a mine with a
model that takes into account waste or waste rock production and abatement possi-
bilities of the mine. We develop a model, in which the mine produces an externality
related to the waste rocks, such as acid mine drainage. We find that the extraction
rate tends to be lower in a mine with higher waste rock production, and that the
optimal tax on the waste rock production is strictly increasing in time. We extend
the model to incorporate an additional externality in the form of a stock pollutant.
We analyze the optimal taxes and show that the typical result that the time path
of the tax on the stock pollutant is inverted U-shaped may be lost in a mine model
with abatement possibility and fixed operation period.
Keywords: Emission taxation; Exhaustible resources; Mining; Optimal control; Stock
pollution; Waste rock.
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1 Introduction
Mining has a large impact on the environment. Clearing land for an open-pit changes
dramatically the landscape and this impact is reinforced by piles of waste rocks. Mining
is also a source of local and global pollutants. Mining activities are typically regulated:
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Opening a mine requires environmental impact assessment and authorities design the
environmental permit of mine. When designing regulation authorities search for a balance
between economically sound business and environmental and social impacts. Developing
and maintaining economically efficient and sustainable mining sector is important for
example for the European Union, which has an under-developed mining sector despite of
the fact the EU is very dependent on imported raw materials (Tiess, 2010).
Mines are typically regulated in a detailed way, for instance, through environmental
permits, which contain technological requirements, limits to various pollutants, rights to
use water and requirement to abate waste water, requirements on placing waste rocks and
many other issues. Current environmental regulation seldom is based on economic insights
or analysis. And as a contrast, economic studies on mines typically do not account for
the details of environmental issues related to mines. What is needed, is optimal dynamic
environmental policy analysis that internalizes environmental impacts and allows for a
simultaneously maximal profits for the mining firms. This study introduces in the analysis
some factors characteristic to mining activities, which are not present in the exploitation
of some other exhaustible resources. Namely, we extend the previous models by adding
polluting waste rocks and their disposal to the analysis.
A large body of literature exists on exhaustible resources, stock externalities and reg-
ulation. For example, Ulph and Ulph (1994) study the role of a carbon tax under stock
externality and exhaustible polluting resource. In particular, they study the time path
of the carbon tax, and find in a special case that the tax is first rising and then declin-
ing. Their analysis is generalized by Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) and Tahvonen (1997).
Also Farzin (1996) analyzes exhaustible resources, stock externalities and taxation. While
in Tahvonen (1997) only nature abates pollution stock, Farzin allows for human abate-
ment but he excludes the natural cleaning process. This literature has then expanded
to cover the existence of Green Paradox (Sinn, 2008; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2012;
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van der Meijden, van der Ploeg, and Withagen, 2015), the analysis of backstop technolo-
gies (Tahvonen, 1997; Tsur and Zemel, 2003; Michielsen, 2014), the more detailed de-
scription of the dynamics of carbon stock in the atmosphere (Farzin and Tahvonen, 1996;
Amigues and Moreaux, 2013; Winter, 2014) and the optimality with carbon capture and
storage (Moreaux and Withagen, 2015).
What is known on environmental taxation from the above stylized infinite-horizon
models is that, under certain simplifying assumptions, the optimal emission tax is the
negative of the shadow value of pollution, and that the time path of the tax first increases
and then decreases. These results bear important message to mining models, as well.
But in contrast to infinite-horizon models, mining is characterized by a finite planning
horizon and mine specific features, different to many other exhaustible resources. Indeed,
the properties of environmental policy in the mining industry are a largely unstudied
issue. Few exceptions can be found, though. Roan and Martin (1996) study mining under
command and control policy but they do not study the optimal policy like we will do in
this paper. Also, Farzin (1996) and Stollery (1985) have examined environmental policy
for a mine. However, Stollery studies flow externality only, when our focus is on stock
externalities. Finally, Sullivan and Amacher (2009) studied mine land restoration and the
divergence between the costs resulting from the choices of the mining firm compared to
the allocation that is socially optimal and the ways to improve the applied bond system.1
We examine the optimal policy for a mine when extraction creates polluting waste
rocks, producing metals from the extracted ore is a source of emissions and abatement
is made by the mining firm and the nature. Production of waste rocks is an essential
ingredient of a mining model, because mining operations create many kinds of waste, such
as topsoil, waste rocks and tailings.2 The quantities of waste rocks produced in mines are
1White et al. (2012) analyze the optimal mine rehabilitation and Pigovian taxation using a discrete-
time model and apply it to Australian context.
2Lottermoser (2010) explains, that to reach the ore vein and to obtain eventually the valuable material,
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large and their replacement is costly. In Australia the amount of produced waste rock
exceeds the amount of mined ore and for example for gold and copper the waste rock
to ore ratio is rising over time (Mudd, 2010). Mining industry in Canada produced in
2008 about 473 Mt of waste rock and tailings (Statistics Canada, 2012). In Finland the
ratio between waste rocks and ore was about 1.5 in the year 2014.3 Globally, Lottermoser
(2010) approximates that in 2006 the quantity of non-fuel mineral commodities produced
was 5 800 Mt and the total production of waste rocks and tailings was 20 000-25 000 Mt.
In this paper we use the term waste rocks to include waste rock and tailings from the
mining operations. Proper disposal of waste rocks incurs increased costs, which we include
in the model.4 Often, especially in the case of open-pit mines, the waste rocks are stored
in the mine area.5 The size of the waste rock stock over time depends on the amount of
extracted material and the amount of waste rocks disposed. The waste rock stock is a
source of a stock pollution, which is caused by acid mine drainage. Acid mine drainage
(AMD) is one of the most serious environmental problems related to mining (Dold, 2014).
In short, AMDmeans the flow of potentially toxic or harmful substances that are separated
from wastes by (often) acidic waters. These acidic waters themselves are a product of
oxidation of sulfide minerals, such as pyrite. (Lottermoser, 2010; Nordstrom, 2011; Dold,
2014; Lèbre, Corder, and Golev, 2017)
We analyze also another externality in addition to AMD: Valuable metals are produced
from extracted material using production process, that releases harmful materials from
say metal, the topsoil and waste rocks must be first removed. Then the ore is mined and processed for
example in a mill from which additional mine wastes called tailings are produced. Afterwards further
processing is still needed. See Lottermoser (2010) for additional information.
3More precisely, the mines in Finland produced 29 544 560 tons of ore (plus valuable stones) and 45
299 631 tons of waste rocks in 2014 (Tukes, 2014).
4In this paper disposing the waste rocks is always costly, although we acknowledge that some types of
waste rocks can include valuable side products for the mine.
5In underground mining the waste rocks are often used to fill old mining tunnels, but presumably not
without cost.
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the extracted material.6 These emissions can be abated both by the mining firm and by
natural processes, as in practice both abatement processes exist simultaneously, but their
interplay has not been examined simultaneously in mining context this far.7 In our model
pollution can be for example discharges to the local water body.
We pose two sets of research questions. First, what are the effects on the extraction
rate of adding polluting waste rocks and their disposal to a mining model? What is the
socially optimal way for to handle the waste rocks? What kind of time path does optimal
tax on waste rock production have? These questions are answered in a model with waste
rock production, in which the regulator maximizes the total discounted welfare. This
model allows us to examine the evolution of waste rock disposal and waste rock stock and
the effect of modeling waste rocks on the extraction rate. The model is then extended
to cover an additional externality. Given that the mine pollutes, the firm may abate
and nature abates in all circumstances, how should the regulator design the optimal
dynamic emission tax to control pollution? This extension to the model outlines the
optimal design of environmental policies under two different externalities calling for two
instruments and facilitates the analysis of the first-best choice of extraction, waste rock
disposal and abatement, and simultaneously, we produce understanding of the optimal
dynamic emission tax. In this extension we also examine the extraction paths of two
mines with different waste rock production and emission coefficients, when the regulator
is unable to apply optimal taxes, but is forced to use time invariant taxes.
To anticipate the main results, we show in the basic model that while the rate of
extraction decreases on the interval where it is positive, the rate of waste rock disposal
always increases. The waste rock stock is strictly increasing or has a single peak value, so
6Hence the paper is related also to the literature with multiple pollutants, which includes
Moslener and Requate (2007) and Ambec and Coria (2013) among others.
7An exception is carbon capture and storage, which is essentially abatement (Moreaux and Withagen,
2015). Compared to our model, they have and infinite time horizon model. In addition to this, our model
has two externalities and is related specifically to mining.
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that the optimal stock is either increased throughout the planning interval or is increased
to its highest value and then decreased. This implies that it is not economically optimal
to dispose of waste rocks immediately after they have been produced. An intuition for
this is that it is optimal to move a part of the waste rock disposal cost to the more
distant future due to discounting of the costs. The cost of replacing waste rocks and
eventual damages from the left-over waste rock stock impacts also the extraction rate.
The extraction rate is either the same or lower in a mine with high waste rock production
rate than in an identical mine with a lower waste rock production rate. In the extension
of the model, we analyze the optimal taxes. We show that the optimal tax on waste rock
production is strictly increasing and outline three possibilities for the dynamically optimal
emission tax. First, the emission tax may be qualitatively similar to the ones found in
the previous literature, that is, it may have an inverted U -shaped time path. Second, the
tax may be always strictly increasing. Third, the tax may increase at the beginning and
at the end, but be decreasing during the middle part of the operation period. However,
without further structure on the model we are unable to say, which of these time paths
is actually optimal. Regarding the extraction paths under time invariant taxes on waste
rock production and emissions, we show that a mine with a lower marginal tax burden is
exhausted before a mine with higher marginal tax burden. This implies, that the mine
with a lower marginal tax burden begins its extraction path at a higher level.
We continue by outlining the model set-up and assumptions regarding the technology
and preferences. The regulator’s problem with the waste rocks is studied next. We then
add the second pollution stock in the model and characterize the optimal taxes and offer
intuitive explanations for the results. The final section concludes our analysis.
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2 Model
The planning interval is [0, T ]. We denote by x0 the amount of extractable material in the
mine at time zero, and we let q(t) be the extraction rate. We assume that the ore body
is homogenous. The amount of material left in the mine at time t is defined by equation
X(t) = x0 −
∫ t
0
q(τ) dτ, (1)
so that X˙ = −q.8 The extraction cost is captured by function C, with C ′(q) > 0 and
C ′′(q) > 0. Let S(t) be the size of the waste rock stock at time t, and let z(t) be the waste
rock disposal rate. Suppose S(0) = 0 and that a unit of extraction produces α units of
waste rocks. Then
S(t) =
∫ t
0
αq(τ)− z(τ) dτ, (2)
and hence S˙ = αq − z. We let the cost function of waste rock disposal be Cs, with value
Cs(z), and assume that Cs′(z) > 0 and Cs′′(z) > 0 for z > 0. Section 3 analyzes the
optimal policy for a mine that produces waste rocks, which cause pollution. The related
damage function Dˆ, with value Dˆ(S(T )) satisfies properties Dˆ′ > 0 and Dˆ′′ > 0 for
S(T ) > 0. Hence the stock causes damages only after the mine has been shut down. This
assumption is admittedly a simplification, but it is based on natural sciences: Dold (2014)
argues that the chemical processes leading to AMD formation begin after the production
stage of the mine given that the mine is properly managed. In particular, the active
tailings imboundment should not cause AMD, if the tailings dam is built properly and if
the tailings imboundment is kept water saturated.9 This is the main reason for assuming
that the waste rock stock causes damages after the production stage.10
8We often drop the time argument from the notation.
9According to Dold (2014, page 635), the AMD formation takes several years even after the mine
shut-down.
10If we would assume that acid mine drainage causes damages during the production stage, then many
of the paper’s results would change. For example, the exponential development of the shadow value of the
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The optimal emission taxation of the stock pollutant is analyzed in Section 4. The
size of the pollution stock is N(t) and it represents for example the level of turbidity of
the local water bodies or the toxic discharges from gold or copper mines such as arsenic.
We denote by parameter δ the rate at which the pollution stock decreases by natural
processes. The rate of change in the pollution stock is positively related to the extraction
rate and negatively to the size of the pollution stock. If the firm also abates at rate a(t),
the time derivative of the pollution stock is given by
N˙(t) = βq(t)− a(t)− δN(t). (3)
Abatement is costly, so we let the abatement cost function be A, with value A(a). We
assume that A′(a) > 0 and A′′(a) > 0 for a > 0. Equation (3) is similar to the one
in Farzin (1996) except that we allow natural processes to clean the environment. The
pollution stock causes damages. We assume that they are captured by a function D, with
D′(N) > 0 and D′′(N) > 0 for N > 0. We do not allow the damages depend on any flow
externality, such as noise and odorous emissions, although these may be important local
impacts of mining.
Literature contains different assumptions about the price of the extracted good. For
example Farzin (1992) assumes, that the price is some (regular enough) function of time.
Others, like Caputo (1990), give less structure to price by assuming that the price is
constant throughout the planning interval.11 Our modeling choice is to use a constant
price. In addition, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1.
waste rock stock plays a crucial role in the proof of propositions 4, 5, 12 and 13. If the waste rock stock
causes damages during the production stage, the shadow value would not develop exponentially, which
might imply that these propositions would not hold in this case. Similarly, if the waste rock production
coefficient α depends on the remaining stock and α′(X) < 0 (exploitation implies higher amount of waste
rocks per extracted unit), then the results would change since the shadow value of the resource stock
would not develop exponentially.
11Also Roan and Martin (1996) make this assumption although they are implicit about it.
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(i) p− C ′(0) > 0;
(ii) Cs′(0) = 0 and A′(0) = 0;
(iii) D′(0) = 0 and Dˆ′(0) = 0.
Assumptions p−C ′(0) > 0, Cs′(0) = 0 and A′(0) = 0 ensure that the rate of extraction
is positive at some point in time, and assumption is D′(0) = 0 is used to show among
other things that it is not optimal to keep the environment in the pristine state, which
we define as the state where pollution stock is zero. Assumptions in (iii) mean that the
first unit of pollution causes approximately zero damages.
3 Regulation under polluting waste rock production
This section analyzes the optimal extraction and waste rock disposal choice of the regu-
lator when the pollution stock is absent. We attach a scrap value to the terminal waste
rock stock, which describes the damages from the left-over waste rocks after the mine has
been shut down. We assume following Caputo and Wilen (1995) that the terminal time
T is fixed.12 The regulator aims to find the extraction and waste rock disposal rates that
maximize the difference between the total discounted value of the instantaneous profit
and the scrap value subject to constraints, that is, the regulator’s problem is to
max
{q(t),z(t)}
∫ T
0
e−ρt [pq(t)− C(q(t))− Cs(z(t))] dt−
∫ ∞
T
e−ρtDˆ(S(T )) dt (4)
s.t X˙(t) = −q(t), X(0) = x0, X(T ) ≥ 0, (5)
S˙(t) = αq(t)− z(t), S(0) = 0, S(T ) ≥ 0, (6)
q(t) ≥ 0, z(t) ≥ 0. (7)
12Note that the fixed horizon does not exclude the physical or economical exhaustion of the mine. The
choice of fixed horizon simplifies the analysis. If T is a choice variable, then the problem may not have
a solution, since increasing T postpones the damages from AMD. This postponement is the benefit of
waiting, and it may not have a corresponding cost unless there are fixed costs in production.
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We simplify the notation by defining
G(S(T )) :=
∫ ∞
T
e−ρtDˆ(S(T )) dt. (8)
Note that G′ > 0 for S(T ) > 0 and G′(0) = 0. This model is a modification of the
“conventional mining model”, in which the waste rocks, the waste rock disposal and the
related costs are absent. Our goal is to analyze the consequences of adding the waste rocks
to the model by comparing the extraction rates under different waste rock production
coefficients α. We also analyze the time paths of the waste rock stock and of the tax on
the waste rock production rate αq − z.
The current value Hamiltonian related to this problem is
H(q, z,X, S, λ, µ) = pq − C(q)− Cs(z)− λq + µ(αq − z), (9)
where λ is the shadow value of resource on the ground and µ is the shadow value of waste
rock stock. The Hamiltonian measures the total net profit at a given instant of time.
Applying the Maximum Principle gives us conditions that are necessary for optimality:13
Hq = p− C ′(q)− λ+ µα ≤ 0, q ≥ 0, qHq = 0, (10)
Hz = −Cs
′(z)− µ ≤ 0, z ≥ 0, zHz = 0, (11)
X˙ = −q, (12)
S˙ = αq − z, (13)
λ˙ = ρλ, (14)
µ˙ = ρµ, (15)
λ(T ) ≥ 0, X(T ) ≥ 0, λ(T )X(T ) = 0, (16)
µ(T ) +G′(S(T )) ≥ 0, S(T ) ≥ 0, [µ(T ) +G′(S(T ))]S(T ) = 0. (17)
13Theorem 5 in Chapter 3 of Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987).
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We obtain from (14) and (15) that λ(t) = λ(0)eρt and µ(t) = µ(0)eρt. The value of
λ at time t is positive or zero.14 Variable µ is the shadow value of the disposable waste
rocks that have been extracted: It is approximately the change in the regulator’s optimal
value function from a unit (jump) increase in the waste rock stock. We will show, that it
is strictly negative. This implies that, at optimum, when the rate of waste rock disposal
is positive, the marginal cost of waste rock disposal equals the marginal benefit of having
one unit of waste rock less on the stock.
Proposition 1 presents some properties of the optimal controls in our mining model.
Proposition 1.
(i) The rate of extraction and the rate of rock removal are continuous in time.
(ii) The rate of extraction is positive on some interval [0, t1] with t1 ≤ T and is strictly
decreasing on the interval [0, t1].
(iii) The waste rock disposal rate is positive and strictly increasing over the whole plan-
ning interval, and the shadow value of the waste rock stock is strictly negative.
(iv) Whenever the rate of extraction is positive, the instantaneous marginal profit of
extraction increases at the rate of interest.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The key results of Proposition 1 are that the rate of extraction declines in time (when
extraction is positive) and that the rate of waste rock disposal increases in time. That the
waste rock disposal always increases by (iii), is intuitive. The regulator needs to restore
some of the waste rocks by the end of the mining. Because the disposal is costly, and the
future costs are discounted, it is optimal to start the disposal at a low disposal rate and
14By 0 ≤ λ(T ) = λ(0)eρT , λ(0) ≥ 0, so that λ(t) ≥ 0.
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to increase the rate until the end. When the controls are positive, we obtain in the case
of differentiable controls that
q˙ =
−ρλ+ ραµ
C ′′(q)
< 0, (18)
z˙ = −
ρµ
Cs′′(z)
> 0, (19)
confirming the properties (ii) and (iii) in Proposition 1.
These results can be applied for the analysis of the optimal tax on the waste rock
production. Since the waste rock disposal rate is always strictly positive, it readily follows
from (11) that the optimal tax, defined as −µ, is strictly increasing in time. We formulate
this result as a proposition.
Proposition 2. The time path of the optimal tax on the waste rock production is strictly
increasing.
Hence, to give the private mining firm correct incentives to dispose waste rocks, the
tax on waste rock production αq − z should be strictly increasing.
We next analyze the behavior of state variables and, in particular, provide a set of
sufficient conditions, which guarantee that the time path of the waste rock stock is either
strictly increasing or has an inverted U -shape. These sufficient conditions are already
shown to hold in this problem (see property (ii) of Proposition 1).
Proposition 3. Let t ∈ (0, T ] and suppose that q > 0 and q˙ < 0 on some interval [0, t),
and q = 0 on [t, T ]. Then S(T ) > 0 and the time path of the waste rock stock has a unique
maximum value.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The unique maximum value is either at t = T or on the interval (0, T ). Hence the time
path is either strictly increasing or has an inverted U -shape. When the waste rock stock
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has a unique maximum on the interval (0, T ), it is optimal to increase first the waste rock
stock to some maximal size and then start disposing the waste rocks at a higher rate than
they are produced by mining operations. Disposing later leads simply to lower costs due
to discounting, thus, disposing all waste rocks immediately when they are produced is
clearly suboptimal. Intuitively speaking, whether the time path has a unique maximum
or is strictly increasing, seems to depend on the steepness of the damage function.
We next characterize the extraction rates under different waste rock production rates
α. In particular, we compare the extraction rates of two mines which are identical except
that one has a high rate αH and the other has a low rate αL. As this suggests, we set
αH > αL.15 With a higher waste rock production rate, extracting a unit of ore entails
a larger waste rock amount and a higher cost of waste rock disposal. Since extraction
is therefore more costly for every unit, one may expect that the extraction rates differ
between high and low coefficient mines. This need not to be the case, as Proposition 4
suggests. It is assumed for this result, that both mines are exhausted during the mines’
operation period.16
Proposition 4. Consider two mines, one with higher rate of waste rock production than
the other, and assume that the mines are otherwise identical. Suppose that both mines are
exhausted. Then they are exhausted at the same instant of time, and the rate of extraction
is the same for both mines.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Proposition 4 shows that not only are the extraction rates the same at the exhaustion
15We also use superscript H for extraction rates and shadow values of the mine with a high coefficient
value and superscript L in case of the mine with a low coefficient value.
16It is a plausible possibility that both mines are exhausted. Tilton and Guzmán (2016) argue on page
142, that a mine often continues to operate until the ore body is exhausted due to high capital cost of
mining. However, because these costs are not included in the model and because the terminal time is
fixed, we study all the cases including ’both mines are exhausted’, ’only one of the mines is exhausted’
and ’neither of the mines are exhausted’.
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time, but they are also the same over the whole planning interval. The case of Proposition
4 can be interpreted as a mine with a large operation period (or scarce resource). Here,
the regulator has sufficient time to move the additional cost of waste rock disposal to the
distant future without affecting the rate of extraction.
The next proposition modifies this result by relaxing the assumption regarding ex-
haustion of both of the mines and includes two cases. In the first case the mine with a
low waste rock production rate is exhausted and the mine with a high rate is not, and in
the second case neither of the mines is exhausted. In these cases extraction rate is lower
with a high waste rock production rate than with a low one.
Proposition 5. The rate of extraction is always lower in a mine with a high waste rock
production rate than with a low production rate, if either
(i) the mine with a low waste rock production rate is exhausted and the one with a high
rate is not, or
(ii) neither of the mines are exhausted.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
This result agrees with the intuition that a mine with higher costs has a lower extrac-
tion rate compared to a low cost mine. Consider finally the case where only the mine
with a high waste rock production rate is exhausted. We demonstrate that this case is
impossible.
Proposition 6. It is impossible that the mine with a high waste rock production rate is
exhausted but the mine with a low rate is not.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
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This is an expected result. Exhaustion of the resource implies that it has been prof-
itable to extract it. If the extraction is profitable with a high waste rock production
rate, it surely is also profitable for a identical mine with a low production rate. Hence
assuming in this case that only the high production rate mine is exhausted violates this
basic intuition.
To conclude, with the exception of the case where both mines are exhausted, higher
waste rock production rate implies lower extraction rate. This is because the cost of
extracting one unit of material becomes larger since some of the extracted material is
costly to dispose of. Note that if T is a choice variable, then at the optimal T the
Hamiltonian equals the partial derivative of the damages from AMD with respect to T .
The waste rock disposal rate is still strictly positive throughout the planning interval, and
it is difficult to rule out the possibility that the mine is exhausted before T . Hence, also
when T is a choice variable, the comparisons of high and low waste rock coefficient mines
must consider the different exhaustion orderings as in the case with fixed T in propositions
4, 5 and 6.
4 Regulation under polluting waste rocks and stock
pollution
The model is now extended to cover also the regulation of a stock pollutant. The regu-
lator accounts for the negative stock externality created by the accumulative emissions.
Therefore, the regulator’s problem is to find the rates of extraction, waste rock disposal
and abatement that maximize the total discounted social welfare consisting of the sum of
gross profits, mine costs and damages from the pollution stock. The price of the extracted
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good is constant.17 The regulator’s problem is to
max
{q(t),z(t),a(t)}
∫ T
0
e−ρt [pq(t)− C(q(t))− Cs(z(t))− A(a(t))−D(N(t))] dt
−G(S(T ))−
∫ ∞
T
e−ρtD(N(t)) dt (20)
s.t X˙(t) = −q(t), X(0) = x0, X(T ) ≥ 0, (21)
S˙(t) = αq(t)− z(t), S(0) = 0, S(T ) ≥ 0, (22)
N˙(t) = βq(t)− a(t)− δN(t), N(0) = 0, N(T ) ≥ 0, (23)
q(t) ≥ 0, z(t) ≥ 0, a(t) ≥ 0. (24)
Now the regulator’s problem contains an additional state variable, which is the pol-
lution stock N . This stock grows with extraction and decreases through abatement and
natural processes. After the terminal time T only natural abatement processes are active.
Hence, after T the size of the pollution stock is given by equation N(t) = N(T )e−δ(t−T ).
We simplify the notation by introducing function R defined as
R(N(T )) :=
∫ ∞
T
e−ρtD
(
N(T )e−δ(t−T )
)
dt. (25)
Note that R′ > 0 for N(T ) > 0 and R′(0) = 0. The current value Hamiltonian related to
regulator’s problem is
H(q, z, a,X, S,N, λ, µ, γ) = pq − C(q)− Cs(z)− A(a)−D(N)− λq+
µ(αq − z) + γ(βq − a− δN), (26)
17This modeling choice is different than for example in Chakravorty and Krulce (1994), Farzin (1996)
and Chakravorty, Krulce, and Roumasset (2005), who use an inverse demand function. We are modeling
the optimal policy of a single mine, which takes the price as given and therefore so does the regulator.
This price can be interpreted as the world market price.
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where γ is the shadow value of pollution stock. Applying the Maximum Principle gives
Hq = p− C ′(q)− λ+ µα+ γβ ≤ 0, q ≥ 0, qHq = 0, (27)
Hz = −Cs
′(z)− µ ≤ 0, z ≥ 0, zHz = 0, (28)
Ha = −A′(a)− γ ≤ 0, a ≥ 0, aHa = 0, (29)
X˙ = −q, (30)
S˙ = αq − z, (31)
N˙ = βq − a− δN, (32)
λ˙ = ρλ, (33)
µ˙ = ρµ, (34)
γ˙ = D′(N) + (δ + ρ)γ, (35)
λ(T ) ≥ 0, X(T ) ≥ 0, λ(T )X(T ) = 0, (36)
µ(T ) +G′(S(T )) ≥ 0, S(T ) ≥ 0, [µ(T ) +G′(S(T ))]S(T ) = 0, (37)
γ(T ) +R′(N(T )) ≥ 0, N(T ) ≥ 0, [γ(T ) +R′(N(T ))]N(T ) = 0. (38)
Equations (29), (32), (35) and (38) as well as the new shadow value in Equation (27)
convey the role of pollution and abatement in the optimal solution. The shadow value of
the pollution stock is approximately the change in the regulator’s optimal value function
from a unit (jump) increase in the pollution stock. Whenever a(t) > 0, this shadow
value is strictly negative, because then γ = −A′(a) < 0 by Equation (29). Therefore,
as the pollution stock grows by one unit, the optimal value decreases approximately by
the amount −γ. Since equation A′(a) = −γ holds for positive abatement, abatement is
made such that along the optimal path the marginal abatement cost equals the marginal
benefit of abatement. Function µ has the same interpretation as before.
The results characterizing the regulator’s choice are the counterpart of Proposition 1.
Proposition 7.
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(i) The extraction rate, the waste rock disposal rate and the abatement rate are contin-
uous in time.
(ii) The extraction rate is positive on some interval.
(iii) The waste rock disposal rate is positive and strictly increasing over the whole plan-
ning interval, and the shadow value of waste rock stock is strictly negative.
(iv) If a(t) > 0 on any time interval, the time path of abatement can be in there decreas-
ing, increasing or both:
(a) if the shadow value of pollution stock is increasing, the time path of abatement
is decreasing;
(b) if the shadow value of pollution stock is decreasing, the time path of abatement
is increasing.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Note first that unlike in Proposition 1, we cannot argue for the case that the rate of
extraction is strictly decreasing. When the optimal controls are differentiable,
q˙ =
−ρλ+ ραµ+ βγ˙
C ′′(q)
, (39)
z˙ = −
ρµ
Cs′′(z)
> 0. (40)
The interpretation of the result that z˙ > 0 is the same as before. The relationship between
abatement and the shadow value of the pollution stock is interesting: The time path for
abatement can be increasing, decreasing or both. Differentiating Ha = 0 with respect to
time, we obtain
− A′′(a)a˙− γ˙ = 0. (41)
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Using this equation and (35), we obtain
a˙ = −
D′(N) + (δ + ρ)γ
A′′(a)
. (42)
Equation (42) suggests that abatement is increasing, provided the instantaneous marginal
damage from an extra unit of pollution is smaller than the discounted future total damage
(multiplied by δ+ ρ), that is when D′(N) < −(δ+ ρ)γ. Condition (41) also allows for an
interpretation of a case when the mining firm is taxed for pollution. Define −γ as the tax
on the flow of net emissions. Then the abatement is increasing exactly when the tax is
increasing. From the viewpoint of (42), abatement is increasing, when the tax multiplied
by δ + ρ is greater than the marginal damage.18
The following short-run comparative statics of the model are derived using conditions
(27)-(29). Here we are interested on how a change either in the waste rock production
coefficient α or in the emission coefficient β affects the optimal choice of the control
variables in the short-run. It is straightforward to derive that
∂q
∂α
= −
µ
−C ′′(q)
< 0,
∂q
∂β
= −
γ
−C ′′(q)
< 0, (43)
∂z
∂α
=
∂z
∂β
=
∂a
∂α
=
∂a
∂β
= 0. (44)
Hence, only the short-run extraction rate is affected by a change either in the waste
rock production coefficient or in the emission coefficient. An increase in either of these
parameters increases the cost of extraction and hence decreases the short-run extraction
rate.
We now turn to the waste rock stock and its taxation. Part (iii) of Proposition 7 and
condition (28) imply that the time path of the optimal tax on waste rock production is
strictly increasing.
18Also, whenever γ˙ < 0, the induced decrease in the optimal value of the program from a unit increase
in the pollution stock is increasing. Intuition suggests and Part (iv) of Proposition 7 confirms, that in
this case it is optimal to increase abatement.
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Proposition 8. The time path of the optimal tax on the waste rock production is strictly
increasing.
However, in the current model the extraction rate is not guaranteed to be decreasing,
and therefore the result in Proposition 3 regarding the time path of the waste rock stock
may not hold. Of course, the result continues to hold in this model also, if it is assumed
that extraction is decreasing.
4.1 Analysis of the optimal emission tax
We next turn to study the time path of the shadow value of the pollution stock and hence
the emission tax. We divide the analysis of the model into two cases by analyzing first the
case in which N(T ) = 0 is optimal and then the case in which N(T ) > 0 is optimal. We
begin with a lemma concerning the exclusion of special cases related to the time paths of
the pollution stock and the shadow value.
Lemma 1.
(i) The pollution stock is not zero on the whole planning interval.
(ii) The shadow value γ cannot be a non-zero constant on any interval.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
That the pollution stock is not zero on the planning interval is reasonable since by
assumption D′(0) = 0 the first units of pollution in the stock cause approximately zero
damages. The second part of the lemma tells us that the shadow value cannot have
non-zero “flat parts” in its time path.
Case N(T ) = 0 is optimal. To analyze the possible time paths for the emission tax,
we first define tˆ ≤ T as the time instant, whose successors have zero pollution stock but
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(possibly) close predecessors positive stock, that is, tˆ satisfies conditions

N(t) > 0, for all t ∈ [t0, tˆ),N(t) = 0, for all t ∈ [tˆ, T ], (45)
for some t0 > 0. This is well-defined, since N(t) ≡ 0 is impossible as shown in Lemma 1.
We need the following lemma for the proof of Proposition 10 below.
Lemma 2.
(i) There exists a time instant t+ < tˆ such that a(t) > 0 for every t ∈ (t+, tˆ).
(ii) γ(t) ≤ 0 for all t ≥ tˆ.
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
Part (i) says that the abatement rate is positive just before the time instant at which
the pollution stock obtains a zero value. This is reasonable, since the natural decrease of
the stock is exponential and is therefore unable by itself to bring the stock to zero. We
continue the analysis on the role of tˆ for the time path of the pollution stock by considering
two cases: one with tˆ < T and the other with tˆ = T . We begin with the case tˆ < T .
The following lemma shows that when the pollution stock becomes zero, also extraction,
abatement and the shadow value of the pollution stock become zero.
Lemma 3. Suppose that tˆ < T . Then
(i) βq(t) = a(t) = 0 for all t ≥ tˆ,
(ii) γ(t) = 0 for all t ≥ tˆ.
Proof. See Appendix A.9.
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In particular, the mine has been exhausted by time instant tˆ in the economic sense,
since extraction is zero afterwards. Since γ(tˆ) = 0, we obtain that
γ(t) =

−e
(δ+ρ)t
∫ tˆ
t D
′(N(τ))e−(δ+ρ)τ dτ, for t ∈ [0, tˆ),
0, for t ∈ [tˆ, T ].
(46)
So γ(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [0, tˆ). Now we can state the main result for the particular case
tˆ < T .
Proposition 9. Suppose that N(T ) = 0 and tˆ < T . Then the shadow value of the
pollution stock, γ, has a U-shaped time path.
Proof. See Appendix A.10.
For tˆ < T , the optimal tax on the rate of pollution flow from the mine can be given as
− γ(t) =

e
(δ+ρ)t
∫ tˆ
t D
′(N(τ))e−(δ+ρ)τ dτ, for t ∈ [0, tˆ),
0, for t ∈ [tˆ, T ],
(47)
where N(t) is the first-best pollution stock at time t. The optimal tax has an inverted U -
shape, which is the result obtained for example by Tahvonen (1997) in an infinite-horizon
problem without abatement. Adding abatement and waste rock disposal, or tinkering
with the time horizon do not change his result at least when tˆ < T .
We now characterize the shadow value of pollution stock, when tˆ = T , so that the
pollution stock is exhausted at the end of the mining operations, not before. The second
main result of this section is the following:
Proposition 10. Suppose that N(T ) = 0 and tˆ = T . Then a(T ) = 0 and the shadow
value of the pollution stock, γ, has a U-shaped time path.
Proof. See Appendix A.11.
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Note that the shadow value of the pollution stock is given by the equation
γ(t) = −e(δ+ρ)t
∫ T
t
D′(N(τ))e−(δ+ρ)τ dτ for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (48)
We have shown that when N(T ) = 0 is optimal, the optimal emission tax has an inverted
U -shaped time path. Now we turn to the other possibility of the optimal value for the
terminal pollution stock.
Case N(T ) > 0 is optimal. The analysis and results of this case mirror the ones ob-
tained above. Namely, we exclude strictly increasing time path for γ as well as the time
path with an inverted U -shaped section.
Proposition 11. Suppose N(T ) > 0. The shadow value of the pollution stock, γ, cannot
have a strictly increasing time path, or a time path, where the first derivative is zero more
than twice.
Proof. See Appendix A.12.
This result rules out many forms of the time path of the shadow value of pollution
stock. Proposition 11 leaves two possibilities in addition to U -shaped time path for the
shadow value. In the first one, the shadow value is strictly decreasing (although it is
possible γ˙ = 0 for a single time instant), and in the second one exactly two instants of
time exist, where γ˙ = 0. Moreover, in the second possibility the first instant of time,
where γ˙ = 0, must give a local minimum for γ, and the second instant of time must give
a local maximum for γ.19
This completes the analysis of optimal emission tax. We have shown that there are
three possibilities for the time path of the optimal tax, −γ. In the first one the time
path of the tax increases at the beginning and then decreases until the end of operations.
19Note that the points, in which γ˙ = 0, cannot be inflection points of γ. If they were, we would obtain
a contradiction as in the proof of Proposition 9, because γ˙ < 0 between these two points.
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In the second one the time path is always increasing, and in the third one it has a local
maximum followed by a local minimum. We provide the following interpretation for the
different taxes.
When the operation period is relatively short, it is plausible that the emissions tax
is always increasing as is also abatement. Equation (35) reveals, that the augmented
interest on the value of discounted total future damages is greater than the instantaneous
marginal damage, that is
(δ + ρ)
∫ T
t
D′(N(τ))e−(δ+ρ)(τ−t) dτ > D′(N(t)). (49)
The pollution stock never reaches such a high value to change the direction of this in-
equality, and it is always the future damages that dominate instantaneous damages. This
tax path, as well as the others, involves a build-up phase for the pollution stock. As it is
always optimal to increase abatement, it is also optimal to move the abatement costs to
the future due to discounting.
When the operation period is longer, the emissions tax may increase at the beginning
and at the end, but is decreasing during the middle part. Again, abatement follows this
pattern. Now, the augmented interest on the value of discounted total future damages is
smaller than the instantaneous marginal damage during the middle part, that is, it holds
during the middle part that
(δ + ρ)
∫ T
t
D′(N(τ))e−(δ+ρ)(τ−t) dτ < D′(N(t)). (50)
Why do tax and abatement decrease? During some initial phase, the pollution stock has
reached such a high value, in which the marginal damages are large relative to future
damages in the sense revealed by (50). A high N means high natural decrease of the
pollution stock. Since the natural process cleans the stock at rate δN , it is beneficial for
the regulator to exploit this by decreasing abatement and thus moving abatement costs
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to the end of planning period. As time approaches T , the pollution stock becomes smaller
and smaller, as well as the rate of abatement by natural processes. The inequality in
(50) changes direction, and abatement starts to increase in order to push the pollution
stock to a low enough value, which continues to cause damages after the mine has been
shut down. Although abatement costs are increased by this, the increase is offset by the
benefits of prior decreased abatement.
When time path of the tax is an inverted U -shape, the future damages are initially
larger than marginal damages as emphasized by (49), so that abatement increases. The
operation period is divided into two parts. In the first one, inequality −(δ+ρ)γ > D′(N),
and in the second one inequality −(δ + ρ)γ < D′(N) hold. Two aspects are relevant
for this time path. It is again beneficial to move abatement costs to the more distant
future during some initial time interval. Also, the regulator can exploit the high natural
abatement rate before the terminal time to decrease abatement. Abatement can decrease
until the end, because it is enough to clean the pollution stock, which has been dispersed
for a longer period of time.
4.2 A comparison of extraction rates of different mines under
time invariant taxes
We compared in Section 3 two mines with different waste rock coefficients and showed
in Proposition 4 that if both the high coefficient mine and the low coefficient mines
are exhausted, then extraction rates are the same. Doing the similar comparisons as
in Section 3 for mines with different emission coefficients β and waste rock production
coefficients α in the model of Section 4 is analytically challenging, since the proofs of
many propositions in Section 3 are based on the exponential development of the costate
variables.20 When the emission stock N(t) is added to the model, costate variable γ may
20See for example the proof of Proposition 4.
25
develop non-exponentially or even non-monotonically, which implies that the methods of
proof in Section 3 become infeasible.
Therefore we perform a similar comparison as in Proposition 4 for the case where the
regulator chooses time invariant (i.e. constant with respect to time) taxes. There are
two reasons for doing this. First, the general comparison with first-best taxes is ana-
lytically challenging for the reasons mentioned above. Second, it may be that choosing
two time variant taxes is infeasible in practice perhaps due to complexity or due to some
political reasons. Hence we assume that the regulator attempts to correct the exter-
nalities by setting time invariant taxes. This assumption is similar to the one made in
van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012).21
Let vS and vN be the taxes for the net waste rock production αq − z and for the net
emissions βq − a, respectively. For the comparison we consider two mines, which have
waste rock production coefficients αH and αL, and emission coefficients βH and βL. Define
K := vS(αH − αL) + vN(βH − βL). (51)
Since vSαH + vNβH is the additional tax burden per extraction unit for mine H, K is
the difference between the marginal tax burdens of the mining firms. A strictly positive
K means that the marginal tax burden of mine H is larger than the burden of mine L.
Denote the exhaustion times of the mines with tH and tL. In the next proposition we
show that constant taxes imply that a mine with a lower marginal tax burden is exhausted
before a mine with higher marginal tax burden.
Proposition 12. Suppose that the regulator applies time invariant taxes and consider
two mines with different waste rock production and emission coefficients, and assume that
the mines are otherwise identical. Suppose that both mines are exhausted. Then
(i) K > 0 and tH < T , imply tL < tH ,
21See their Section 3.2.
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(ii) K = 0 implies tL = tH .
Proof. See Appendix A.13.
When the regulator applies time invariant taxes and tH < T , the mining firm with a
lower marginal tax burden exhausts the resource stock faster than the mine with a higher
marginal tax burden.
It is intuitively clear that since both of the mines are exhausted, the mine with a lower
tax burden has an extraction profile that begins at a higher level than the profile of the
mine with a higher tax burden. In addition, it seems the extraction profiles cross exactly
once. Note that Proposition 12 is silent about the possibility that tH = T when K > 0.
In this case it of course holds that tL ≤ T . Whether tL < T or tL = T holds, it must be
that the extraction paths of the mines cross once and that the initial extraction level is
higher in mine L than in mine H. This is the contents of the last proposition, which says
that the extraction path qL crosses path qH from the above when K > 0.
Proposition 13. Suppose that the regulator applies time invariant taxes and consider
two mines with different waste rock production and emission coefficients, and assume that
the mines are otherwise identical. Suppose that both mines are exhausted. Let K > 0.
Then qL(t) > qH(t) on [0, tˆ) and qL(t) < qH(t) on [tˆ, T ) for some tˆ ∈ (0, T ).
Proof. See Appendix A.14.
5 Conclusions and discussion on further research
We examined the optimal environmental policy for a mine when some of the special
features of mining are taken into account. In our model, extraction creates waste rocks
causing pollution such as acid mine drainage, producing metals from the extracted ore is a
source of emissions and abatement is made by the mine owner and the nature. Production
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of waste rocks alone as an essential ingredient of mining operations represents a change
towards more realistic modeling of mines.
Our results show that the higher waste rock production rate tends to decrease the
rate of extraction compared to an identical mine with a lower waste rock production rate.
However, it can also be that the extraction rates are the same. Regarding taxation, we
found that the optimal tax on the waste rock production to correct the externality caused
by them is strictly increasing in time. Hence, we find that to correct the externality
caused for example by acid mine drainage calls for an increasing tax. In addition, if
the mine produces another pollutant and the damages depend on its stock, there are
three possibilities for the optimal emission tax. The first one is that the emission tax is
qualitatively similar to the ones found in the previous literature such as Ulph and Ulph
(1994) and Tahvonen (1997). The second possibility is that the emission tax is always
strictly increasing, and the third is that the tax increases at the beginning and at the end,
but is decreasing during the middle part of the operation period.22
Our work represents a step towards a more concrete and policy relevant modeling of
mines to provide more economic insights, for instance, in the determination of environmen-
tal permit for mines. The current model includes one stylized fact of mining operations,
namely the waste rocks that pollute and their costly disposal. Incorporation of other
stylized facts, such as capacity constraints on extraction and cut-off grade selection, con-
stitute a possible extension.23 Although there is an implicit upper bound on extraction in
the current model (defined by price and marginal cost), a more detailed modeling of the
capacity choice and the relationship between it and the environmental policy is needed.24
22Our model has not analyzed the actual implementation of the two taxes, which is an important
practical aspect.
23There already exists literature on capacity choice in mining and capacity constraints (for example
Campbell 1980; Lozada 1993; Cairns 2001; Holland 2003) and on the analysis of cut-off grades in a
heterogeneous ore body (for example Krautkraemer 1988; Shinkuma 2000; Cairns and Shinkuma 2003).
24Stollery (1985) studies this in a set-up with flow pollution.
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Furthermore, since for some metals the waste rock to ore ratio is increasing over time, a
reasonable modification of the model is to let the waste rock production depend on the
amount of extractable material left in the mine.
The monitoring and enforcement of a mine is also an important issue, which has not
received much attention in the literature. This is surprising given that noncompliance
with the environmental policy happens in the industry from time to time. Therefore, a
sensible research question is that given a chosen regulative instrument, how should the
monitoring and enforcement of the mine be designed? Also the current model does not
analyze mine rehabilitation. Monitoring and enforcement are also related to rehabilitation
of the mine area, since after the mining operations have ceased, monitoring is often still
needed.25
Another relevant extension would be to analyze uncertain damages due to acid mine
drainage. Furthermore, waste dams can be subject to catastrophic accidents, which can
cause massive damages. One option to analyze the relation of optimal taxation with envi-
ronmental accidents in mining would be let the terminal time of the planning interval be a
random variable as for example in Boukas, Haurie, and Michel (1990), Clarke and Reed
(1994) and Schumacher (2011). This variable would be date of the accident, and the
probability of the accident would depend on the waste rock stock.
In our current model the price of the resource is given without emphasis on market
structure.26 We have basically only asked how should a single mining firm be taxed to
correct one or two externalities. To obtain better picture for policy advices regarding
environmental policy, a more detailed model should contain multiple resource producers
and the price formation should be endogenous.
25Rehabilitation of mine sites and bond design has been analyzed in Sullivan and Amacher (2009) and
White et al. (2012).
26Market structure and exhaustible resources have received much attention, see for example
Benchekroun, Halsema, and Withagen (2009).
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Since the control set U := {(q, z) ∈ R2 | q ≥ 0, z ≥ 0} is convex and H is strictly
concave in (q, z), the control functions are continuous functions.
(ii) First we show that q(t) > 0 at some t. Assume not, that is q(t) ≡ 0. Then
X(T ) = x0 > 0, and therefore by (16) λ(T ) = 0. This implies λ(t) ≡ 0. Equation
(13) together with boundary condition S(T ) ≥ 0, implies z(t) ≡ 0. Then by assumption
Cs′(0) = 0 (recall Assumption 1) and by condition (11), µ(t) ≥ 0 for every t. This yields
a contradiction since (10), that is, condition
p− C ′(0) + µα ≤ 0, (A.1)
and assumption p − C ′(0) > 0, imply µ(t) < 0. Therefore q(t) > 0 at some t. Since q(t)
is continuous, it must be that q(t) > 0 at some interval [t0, t1].
Now we show that the rate of extraction is strictly decreasing, when the rate of ex-
traction is positive. We first show that µ(0) < 0. Note that z > 0 somewhere: Suppose
not, that is, suppose z ≡ 0. Then S(T ) > 0 and G′(S(T )) > 0. By (11) and assumption
Cs′(0) = 0, µ ≥ 0, which implies by (15) that µ(0) ≥ 0. Hence µ(T ) ≥ 0. Because
µ(T ) ≥ 0 and G′(S(T )) > 0, also µ(T ) + G′(S(T )) > 0, which implies by condition
(17) that S(T ) = 0. This contradicts S(T ) > 0. Therefore z > 0 somewhere. Be-
cause Cs′(z) = −µ(0)eρt for some t, µ(0) < 0. To show that the rate of extraction is
strictly decreasing let t+0 , t
+
1 ∈ [t0, t1] with t
+
0 < t
+
1 . We obtain, after using (10) twice and
subtracting, that on the interval where q(t) > 0,
p− C ′(q(t+0 ))− p+ C
′(q(t+1 )) = (A.2)
λ(0)[eρt
+
0 − eρt
+
1 ]− µ(0)[eρt
+
0 − eρt
+
1 ] < 0. (A.3)
This implies q(t+1 ) < q(t
+
0 ) by assumption C
′′(q) > 0.
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Continuity of q(t) implies that we can choose t0 = 0, because otherwise q(t) would be
discontinuous or increasing somewhere.
(iii) Recall that z(t) > 0 at some interval [t2, t3]. At this interval, control z(t) is
strictly increasing. This is true because on this interval, Cs′(z) = −µ(0)eρt, which clearly
implies that z(t) must increase: Let t+2 , t
+
3 ∈ [t2, t3] with t
+
2 < t
+
3 . Using (11) twice and
subtracting, we get
Cs′(z(t+3 ))− C
s′(z(t+2 )) = µ(0)[e
ρt+
2 − eρt
+
3 ] > 0. (A.4)
This implies z(t+3 ) > z(t
+
2 ) by assumption C
s′′(q) > 0. Note in addition that because
µ(0) < 0, µ(t) < 0 for all t. Because z(t) is strictly increasing and continuous, there can
be only one interval, where z(t) > 0. In addition, since µ(0) < 0, z(0) > 0: Suppose not.
By condition (11)
− Cs′(0)− µ(0) ≤ 0. (A.5)
Then by assumption Cs′(0) = 0, µ(0) ≥ 0, which contradicts µ(0) < 0.
(iv) When q(t) > 0,
p− C ′(q) = (λ(0)− µ(0)α)eρt. (A.6)
Because λ(0) > 0 and µ(0) < 0, the instantaneous marginal profit rises at the rate of
interest.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Note first that µ(T ) < 0 and (17) imply G′(S(T )) > 0. This implies S(T ) > 0. For
the second part of the result, we show first that αq(0) ≤ z(0) is generally impossible at
optimum. Suppose that αq(0) ≤ z(0) holds. Then S˙(0) ≤ 0, and because q˙ < 0 for every
t ∈ [0, t) and z˙ > 0 for every t ∈ [0, T ], S˙(t) < 0 for all t ∈ (0, T ]. Then S(T ) > 0 cannot
be satisfied. Therefore, inequality βq(0) > z(0) holds implying that S˙(0) > 0. Note that
the time path of S cannot have a minimum: Suppose it has a minimum. At such a point
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extraction is positive and S¨ ≥ 0, which is equivalent with αq˙ ≥ z˙ by Equation (13). But
since z˙ > 0, we obtain q˙ > 0, which contradicts Part (ii) Proposition 1.
Hence the time path is either strictly increasing or has a maximum value on (0, T ).
If the path is strictly increasing, the maximum value is at t = T . We show next, that
if the path has a maximum value on (0, T ), the maximum value is unique. To this end,
suppose that the stock has a maximum value at t0 < T , which is denoted by S(t0). The
stock cannot have another local maximum: Suppose it does. Two possibilities exists in
this case: either there exists t1 with a local maximum satisfying S(t) < max{S(t0), S(t1)}
for all t ∈ (t0, t1), or there exists a local maximum t2 satisfying S(t) = S(t0) for all
t ∈ (t0, t2). The first case is ruled out, because it implies that S has a local minimum
on (t0, t1), which contradicts the above reasoning. To rule out the second possibility, we
note that S˙(t0) = 0 and S˙(t) > 0 for every t ∈ (0, t0). Equation S˙(t0) = 0 is equivalent to
βq(t0) = z(t0). Since q˙ ≤ 0 and z˙ > 0, it must hold that after t0 we have S˙(t) < 0. This
contradicts S(t) = S(t0) for all t ∈ (t0, t2).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Let tL be the time instant when the mine is exhausted with the waste rock production
rate αL and let tH be the respective time instant with coefficient αH . We show first that
tL > tH is impossible, so assume that tL > tH holds. In both cases q˙ < 0 whenever q > 0.
Because of this and because extraction is zero after exhaustion, qH hits zero before tL.
Since the mine is exhausted in both cases,
∫ tH
0
qH(τ) dτ = x0 =
∫ tL
0
qL(τ) dτ. (A.7)
It follows from these, that there exists a time instant tˆ < tH for which
qL(tˆ) = qH(tˆ) > 0. (A.8)
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From this and from the necessary conditions of the models’ problems, we obtain the
following equations
p− C ′(qH(tˆ)) = λH(tˆ)− αHµH(tˆ), (A.9)
p− C ′(qL(tˆ)) = λL(tˆ)− αLµL(tˆ). (A.10)
From (A.8)-(A.10) we obtain that
λL(tˆ)− αLµL(tˆ) = λH(tˆ)− αHµH(tˆ). (A.11)
Furthermore, by the necessary conditions,
λL(t) = λL(0)eρt, λH(t) = λH(0)eρt, µH(t) = µH(0)eρt and µL(t) = µL(0)eρt.
(A.12)
Define now function f with f(t) := λL(t) − αLµL(t) − λH(t) + αHµH(t), and note that
f(t) = f(0)eρt and f(tˆ) = f(0)eρtˆ. Since by (A.11) f(tˆ) = 0, we obtain that f(0) = 0.
Hence f(t) ≡ 0. Since (A.9) and (A.10) hold also for other time instants with positive
extraction, we obtain equation
p− C ′(qL(t))− p+ C ′(qH(t)) = f(t) = 0. (A.13)
Hence qL(t) = qH(t) for all t with positive qL and qH . But then
∫ tL
0
qL(τ) dτ =
∫ tH
0
qL(τ) dτ +
∫ tL
tH
qL(τ) dτ (A.14)
=
∫ tH
0
qH(τ) dτ +
∫ tL
tH
qL(τ) dτ (A.15)
= x0 +
∫ tL
tH
qL(τ) dτ > x0, (A.16)
which contradicts (A.7).
By the same principles and after minor changes, tL < tH is also impossible. Hence
tL = tH . Similar arguments as used above show that the extraction rates are the same.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
(i) Since the mine with coefficient αH is not exhausted, λH(T ) = 0, and therefore λH(t) ≡
0. The rate of extraction with coefficient αH , qH , cannot be anywhere greater than
the rate of extraction with coefficient αL, qL: Suppose otherwise, that is, suppose that
qH(t) > qL(t) for some t ∈ [0, T ]. Then there exists a time instant tˆ < T for which
qL(tˆ) = qH(tˆ), (A.17)
and we obtain using similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 4 that λL(t) −
αLµL(t) = −αHµH(t) for every t with positive extraction levels. This means that qH(t) =
qL(t) (when extraction is positive), which yields a contradiction with qH(t) > qL(t).
Since the mine with αL is exhausted and the mine with αH is not, the extraction rates
cannot be equal at any time instant, because similar arguments as above show that the
extraction rates are equal for all time instants in such a case.
(ii) We will show that qH < qL for all t ∈ [0, T ] by contradiction. To this end, we
assume qH ≥ qL for some t ∈ [0, T ]. Note then that qH ≥ qL for all t ∈ [0, T ]: Otherwise
(that is, if qH < qL for some t) there would exist a time instant tˆ such that qH = qL,
which implies using similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 4 that qH ≡ qL,
which contradicts inequality qH < qL for some t.
Because neither of the mines are exhausted, λH = λL ≡ 0. Since qH ≥ qL, p−C ′(qH) ≤
p − C ′(qL). Combining this with (10) gives us −αHµH ≤ −αLµL when extraction is
positive. Then
− µH ≤ −
αL
αH
µL < −µL, (A.18)
since αH > αL. This implies together with equation Cs′(z) = −µ from (11), that zL > zH
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. This and qH ≥ qL for all t ∈ [0, T ] imply by (13) that S˙H > S˙L for all
t ∈ [0, T ]. Combining this with SH(0) = SL(0) = 0 gives
SH(T ) > SL(T ). (A.19)
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Hence G′(SH(T )) > G′(SL(T )). We obtain using these and (17) that
− µH(T ) = G′(SH(T )) > G′(SL(T )) = −µL(T ), (A.20)
but −µH(T ) > −µL(T ) contradicts (A.18). Hence qH < qL for all t ∈ [0, T ].
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Since the mine with a high waste rock production rate is exhausted and the one with a
low rate is not, we have
x0 =
∫ tH
0
qH(τ) dτ >
∫ T
0
qL(τ) dτ. (A.21)
This clearly implies that there exists a time instant at which qH > qL. Then qH > qL for
all t ∈ [0, T ] (otherwise we would again obtain a contradiction). Note that λL ≡ 0. When
qL > 0, condition (10) gives us after subtraction that
p− C ′(qH)− p+ C ′(qL) = λH − αHµH + αLµL. (A.22)
Since the left-side of this is strictly negative, we obtain
λH − αHµH + αLµL < 0. (A.23)
This implies
− µH < −
λH
αH
−
αL
αH
µL < −
αL
αH
µL < −µL. (A.24)
Because qH > qL for all t ∈ [0, T ] and −µH < −µL for all t ∈ [0, T ], we obtain a
contradiction using similar lines of reasoning as in the proof of Part (ii) of Proposition 5.
Hence it is impossible that a mine with a high waste rock production rate is exhausted,
but the mine with a lower rate is not.
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 7
(i) Similar to the proof of Part (i) of Proposition 1.
(ii) Assume that q is always zero. With similar reasoning as in the proof of Part (ii)
of Proposition 1, it follows from this that µ(t) ≥ 0 for all t. (Note: Because of γ(t), we
cannot argue directly for a contradiction using condition Hq ≤ 0 in (27).) Since q(t) ≡ 0,
(32) becomes
N˙ = −a− δN, (A.25)
whose solution using the given initial condition is
N(t) =
∫ t
0
−a(τ)e−δ(t−τ) dτ. (A.26)
Then, because a(t) ≥ 0,
N(T ) =
∫ T
0
−a(τ)e−δ(T−τ) dτ ≤ 0, (A.27)
implying that a(t) ≡ 0. Condition (29) and assumption A′(0) = 0, imply −γ ≤ 0 or
equivalently γ ≥ 0. Condition Hq ≤ 0 becomes now
p− C ′(0) + µα+ γβ ≤ 0, (A.28)
implying that µ < 0. This contradicts µ ≥ 0. Therefore there exists a time instant where
q(t) > 0. Again, by continuity of q, there is an interval, where q(t) > 0.
(iii) Similar to the proof of Part (iii) of Proposition 1.
(iv) Let t1, t2 ∈ I ⊂ [0, T ] with t1 < t2, where I is an interval with a(t) > 0. Using
(29) twice, we obtain equation
A′(a(t2))− A′(a(t1)) = γ(t1)− γ(t2). (A.29)
The conclusion follows from this, since A′′ > 0.
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A.7 Proof of Lemma 1
(i) Suppose on the contrary to the claim that N(t) = 0 on [0, T ]. Recall that by Proposi-
tion 7 there exists an interval I ∈ [0, T ], where q > 0. Then on that interval βq = a > 0 (by
(32)) and γ˙ = (δ+ ρ)γ (by (35) and by D′(0) = 0). By (29), A′(a) = −γ > 0 on I, imply-
ing that γ˙ < 0. Then a grows on I by Proposition 7. But by (27), p−C ′(q) = λ−µα−γβ
on I, which implies that q is decreasing on I. This contradicts equation βq = a for all
t ∈ I.
(ii) Suppose on the contrary to the claim that there exists an interval I ⊂ [0, T ] such
that γ˙ = 0 and γ 6= 0 for every t ∈ I. Then it holds on the interval I that
γ = −
D′(N)
δ + ρ
, (A.30)
a˙ = 0, (A.31)
q˙ =
−ρλ+ ραµ
C ′′(q)
< 0. (A.32)
Since γ˙ = 0 and (A.30) holds, N˙ = 0. This implies that βq − a = δN for every t ∈ I.
Differentiating this with respect to time yields βq˙− a˙ = 0. This is equivalent with βq˙ = 0,
since (A.31) holds. But this contradicts (A.32).
A.8 Proof of Lemma 2
(i) Suppose on the contrary to the claim that such a time instant does not exists, that
is, suppose that a(t) = 0 for every t ∈ (t0, tˆ), where |tˆ − t0| < ǫ for any small ǫ > 0. By
the definition of tˆ, N(t) > 0 on the interval (t0, tˆ) for sufficiently small ǫ. Let t1 ∈ (t0, tˆ).
Then we obtain that
N(tˆ) =
∫ tˆ
0
q(τ)e−δ(tˆ−τ) dτ −
∫ tˆ
0
a(τ)e−δ(tˆ−τ) dτ (A.33)
=
∫ tˆ
0
q(τ)e−δ(tˆ−τ) dτ −
∫ t1
0
a(τ)e−δ(t
1−τ) dτ, (A.34)
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by the above assumption about abatement. Because q(t) ≥ 0, we obtain that N(tˆ) ≥
N(t1). However, the definition of tˆ implies that N(t1) > N(tˆ). These yield a contradiction
N(tˆ) > N(tˆ).
(ii) Since γ(t) < 0 for every t ∈ (t+, tˆ), γ(tˆ) ≤ 0 by the continuity of the costate. The
solution to (35) is
γ(t) =
∫ t
0
D′(N(τ))e−(δ+ρ)(τ−t) dτ + e(δ+ρ)tγ(0). (A.35)
This can be used to rewrite γ(tˆ) ≤ 0 as
γ(tˆ) =
∫ tˆ
0
D′(N(τ))e−(δ+ρ)(τ−tˆ) dτ + e(δ+ρ)tˆγ(0) (A.36)
= e(δ+ρ)tˆ
[ ∫ tˆ
0
D′(N(τ))e−(δ+ρ)τ dτ + γ(0)
]
(A.37)
≤ 0. (A.38)
Let t ≥ tˆ. Then
γ(t) =
∫ t
0
D′(N(τ))e−(δ+ρ)(τ−t) dτ + e(δ+ρ)tγ(0) (A.39)
= e(δ+ρ)t
[ ∫ t
0
D′(N(τ))e−(δ+ρ)τ dτ + γ(0)
]
(A.40)
= e(δ+ρ)t
[ ∫ tˆ
0
D′(N(τ))e−(δ+ρ)τ dτ + γ(0)
]
(A.41)
≤ 0, (A.42)
where the last equality follows from assumption D′(0) = 0, since after tˆ we know that
N(t) = 0 by definition, and the inequality follows from (A.37)-(A.38).
A.9 Proof of Lemma 3
(i) Since N(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [tˆ, T ], it must be that βq(t) = a(t) there. Assume contrary
to the claim that there exists I ⊂ [tˆ, T ] such that a(t) > 0 on I. Then γ(t) < 0 on I and
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therefore a˙ > 0 on I, because γ˙ = (δ + ρ)γ < 0 on I. But by p − C ′(q) = λ − µα − γβ,
q˙ < 0 on I. This contradicts condition
βq(t) = a(t) for all t ∈ [tˆ, T ]. (A.43)
(ii) Let t ≥ tˆ. Part (ii) of Lemma 2 says that γ(t) ≤ 0. Part (i) of the current Lemma
says that a(t) = 0. Condition (29) and assumption A′(0) = 0 give then that −γ(t) ≤ 0.
These imply γ(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [tˆ, T ].
A.10 Proof of Proposition 9
The proof has similarities with the proof of Proposition 1 in Tahvonen (1997).
Note first that γ˙(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, tˆ) is not true, since γ˙(0) = D′(N(0)) + (δ +
ρ)γ(0) = (δ + ρ)γ(0) < 0.
Recall that γ(T ) = 0 and suppose that the time path has an inverted U -shape some-
where. There must exist a closed interval I = [t1, t2], where γ˙ < 0 on the interior of I and
γ˙(t1) = γ˙(t2) = 0. This implies that q˙ < 0 and a˙ ≥ 0 on I, so that
βq˙ − a˙ < 0 for all t ∈ I. (A.44)
Note that γ¨(t1) ≤ 0 and γ¨(t2) ≥ 0. By Equation (35), γ¨(t) = D′′(N(t))N˙(t) at t = t1 and
at t = t2, implying that
N˙(t1) ≤ 0 and N˙(t2) ≥ 0. (A.45)
The derivative γ¨ = D′′(N(t))N˙(t) + (δ+ ρ)γ˙ is positive somewhere on the interval [t1, t2],
implying that N˙(t) > 0 there, since γ˙ < 0 on (t1, t2). Then there exists t3 ∈ [t1, t2) such
that N˙(t3) = 0. But then
N¨(t3) = βq˙(t3)− a˙(t3) ≥ 0, (A.46)
which is a contradiction with (A.44). Hence the time path is U -shaped.
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A.11 Proof of Proposition 10
We argue that a(T ) = 0. Assume on the contrary that a(T ) > 0. Then γ(T ) < 0.
However, condition (38) together with N(T ) = 0 and R′(0) = 0 imply γ(T ) ≥ 0, which
contradicts γ(T ) < 0. Hence a(T ) = 0. Since tˆ = T , N(t) > 0 for all t ∈ (T − ǫ, T ) for
some (small) ǫ > 0. Note that
N˙(T ) = βq(T )− a(T )− δN(T ) = βq(T )− a(T ), (A.47)
which is non-positive at optimum. Since βq(T ) ≤ a(T ) = 0, we have that q(T ) = 0. By
Lemma 2, we have a(t) > 0 for all t ∈ (T − ǫ, T ). For these instants of time, γ(t) < 0,
implying that γ(T ) ≤ 0. This and γ(T ) ≥ 0 obtained using condition (38) as above, imply
that γ(T ) = 0. Thus, when tˆ = T and N(T ) = 0, the shadow value of the pollution stock,
γ, has a U -shaped time path by the same principles as in the proof of Proposition 9.
A.12 Proof of Proposition 11
Note that in this case condition (38) implies −γ(T ) = R′(N(T )). Since the right-side is
strictly positive, we obtain γ(T ) < 0. This implies together with
γ(T ) =
∫ T
0
D′(N(τ))e−(δ+ρ)(τ−T ) dτ + e(δ+ρ)Tγ(0), (A.48)
that also γ(0) < 0. By (35) and assumption D′(0) = 0,
γ˙(0) = D′(N(0)) + (δ + ρ)γ(0) = (δ + ρ)γ(0) < 0. (A.49)
Note that γ˙(0) < 0 excludes the possibility that γ˙(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. This leaves
four possibilities:
1. γ˙(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ];
2. γ˙(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] except at an isolated time instant at which γ˙(t) = 0;
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3. The time path is U -shaped;
4. The time path is first decreasing, then increasing and lastly decreasing again.
There are no other possibilities: Suppose on the contrary that the time path has three
points with γ˙(t) = 0. Then the path has an inverted U -shape somewhere, and the same
arguments as in the proof of Proposition 9 produce a contradiction.
A.13 Proof of Proposition 12
(i) Assume on the contrary to the claim that tL ≥ tH . Given the time invariant taxes and
strictly positive extraction rates, the necessary conditions of the mining firms’ problems
include the following conditions:
p− C ′(qH(t)) = λH(t) + αHvS + βHvN , (A.50)
p− C ′(qL(t)) = λL(t) + αLvS + βLvN . (A.51)
Since both mines are exhausted and tL ≥ tH , the time paths of the mines’ extraction rates
must cross at least once.
Consider first the possibility that tL > tH . Since there exists a smallest time instant
tˆ such that qH(tˆ) = qL(tˆ), equations (51), (A.50) and (A.51) imply that
λH(tˆ)− λL(tˆ) = −K < 0. (A.52)
Note that the function t 7→ λH(t) − λL(t) is then an exponentially decreasing function,
obtains strictly negative values, and
λH(t)− λL(t) ∈ (−K, 0) for all t ∈ [0, tˆ). (A.53)
This and equations (A.50) and (A.51) imply
− C ′(qH(t)) + C ′(qL(t)) = λH(t)− λL(t) +K > 0 for all t ∈ [0, tˆ). (A.54)
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Hence
qL(t) > qH(t) for all t ∈ [0, tˆ). (A.55)
If tˆ is unique, then qL(t) > qH(t) for all t except at t = tˆ. This clearly implies that
the total extraction for mine L is strictly greater than x0, which is impossible. Suppose
that tˆ is not unique. Then Equation (A.52) holds for at least two time instants, which
contradicts the fact that the function λH(t)− λL(t) decreases exponentially.
Consider the possibility that tL = tH . Note that continuity implies that equations
(A.50) and (A.51) hold also at tL. Because tL = tH and tH < T , there are two possibilities:
either the extraction paths cross at some instant of time smaller than tL, or the paths
don’t cross. If they cross, then Equation (A.52) holds for two time instants, which again
contradicts the fact that the function λH(t)−λL(t) decreases exponentially. If they don’t
cross, then one of the mines is not exhausted, which is a contradiction.
(ii) Assume on the contrary to the claim that tL > tH or tL < tH . First, let tL > tH .
Following the reasoning of Part (i), Equation (A.52) implies that λH(tˆ) = λL(tˆ). Hence
qL(t) = qH(t) for all t. But qL(t) is strictly positive on [tH , tL). These imply that the
total extraction under profile qL(t) is strictly greater than x0, which is a contradiction.
The proof for the other case, tL < tH , is similar.
A.14 Proof of Proposition 13
The proof is divided into two cases, one with tH < T and the other with tH = T . Consider
the first possibility. The proof of Proposition 12 shows that tL < tH and that there exists tˆ
such that qL(tˆ) = qH(tˆ). There is only one such time instant, since otherwise λH(t)−λL(t)
would not decrease exponentially. Since tL < tH , qL(t) < qH(t) for all t ∈ (tˆ, tH ]. This
implies that qL(t) > qH(t) for all t ∈ [0, tˆ).
Consider then the second possibility. If tH = T , then either tL < T or tL = T . If
tL < T , the extraction profiles of the mines must cross, since otherwise mine L is not
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exhausted. This can occur only once, since otherwise the function λH(t)− λL(t) does not
evolve exponentially. Then it must be that the extraction path qL crosses path qH from
the above. Next it is shown that if tL = T , then qH(T ) > qL(T ). To see this, suppose
qH(T ) ≤ qL(T ), and note that qH cannot always equal qL, since K > 0. Hence the paths
are not the same, but they nevertheless must cross. As in the proof of Proposition 12,
there exists tˆ such that qL(t) > qH(t) for all t ∈ [0, tˆ). But since qH(T ) ≤ qL(T ), the
paths cross twice, which again means that the function λH(t) − λL(t) does not decrease
exponentially. Hence qH(T ) > qL(T ), and the extraction path qL crosses path qH from
the above.
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